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JOHN NICHOLAS WILLIAMS
MOORE’S PARADOXES AND CONSCIOUS BELIEF*
ABSTRACT. For Moore, it is a paradox that although I would be absurd
in asserting that (it is raining but I don’t believe it is) or that (it is raining
but I believe it isn’t), such assertions might be true. But I would be also
absurd in judging that the contents of such assertions are true. I argue for
the strategy of explaining the absurdity of Moorean assertion in terms of
conscious Moorean belief. Only in this way may the pathology of Moo-
rean absurdity be adequately explained in terms of self-contradiction.
David Rosenthal disagrees with this strategy. Ironically, his higher-order
thought account has the resources to fulﬁl it. Indeed once modiﬁed and
supplemented, it compares favourably with Brentano’s rival account of
conscious belief.
INTRODUCTION
As Moore observed, it would be ‘‘absurd’’ of me to assert, ‘‘I
went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did’’
(1942, p. 543). Nonetheless my assertion might be true. For you
may imagine a consistent scenario in which I fail to believe the
truth that I went to the pictures last Tuesday. Moreover, if you
contradict my assertion then your words, ‘‘If he went to the
pictures last Tuesday then he believes he did’’ do not express a
necessary truth.1 Moore calls the fact that it is absurd to assert
such a possible truth, a ‘‘paradox’’ (1993, p. 209). Most people
who are confronted with Moore’s example say that in some
sense the speaker has contradicted himself, even after admitting
that no contradiction lies in the words of the assertion. So a
natural way of solving the paradox is to explain the absurdity
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of the assertion in a way that identiﬁes a contradiction-like
phenomenon but not with its content.
Moore did not seem to notice that it would also be absurd of
me to silently judge that I fail to believe the truth that I went to
the pictures last Tuesday. This suggests the strategy of
explaining the absurdity of Moorean assertion in terms of the
absurdity of Moorean belief.2 But a more sophisticated variant
is to explain the absurdity of Moorean assertion in terms of
conscious belief, in other word, in terms of beliefs one is aware
of having. After all, my judgement can hardly be a belief of
which I am unaware. My aim is to argue that this strategy is
fruitful. For only such an analysis can do justice to the
pathology of Moorean belief by diagnosing it in terms of a
single self-contradictory belief. I compare two ways of carrying
this out. Although he does not endorse the strategy, the ﬁrst
combines a modiﬁcation of David Rosenthal’s higher-order
thought theory with the principle that conscious belief both
collects and distributes over conjunction. A rival approach is to
adopt Brentano’s deﬁnition of conscious belief, together with
the principle that belief of any sort distributes over conjunction.
I argue that the Rosenthal-inspired strategy is best. I then
explain the absurdity of Moorean assertion in terms of con-
scious belief.
An important fact still often overlooked in the debate is that
Moore also observes that to say, ‘‘I believe that he has gone
out, but he has not’’ would be likewise ‘‘absurd’’ (1944, p. 204).
Unlike Moore’s ﬁrst example, which has the omissive form p &
I don’t believe that p, this has the commissive3 form, p & I believe
that not-p.4 This semantic diﬀerence is inherited from the gen-
uine diﬀerence between agnostics and atheists. The result is the
diﬀerence between the omission of speciﬁc true belief and the
commission of a speciﬁc mistake in belief. So the explanation of
Moorean absurdity had better explain both forms.
In §1, I defend Shoemaker’s strategy of explaining the
absurdity of Moorean belief before explaining that of Moorean
assertion. After noting features of conscious belief in §2, I ex-
plain in §3 why the awareness of belief is important to Moorean
absurdity, notably that the irrationality of Moorean belief
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should not be diagnosed as a pair of contradictory beliefs but
rather as a single self-contradictory belief. Since this distinction
is underpinned by the failure of belief to collect over conjunc-
tion, I argue in §4 that although belief of any kind distributes
over conjunction, only conscious belief collects over conjunc-
tion. In §5, I show that there are diﬃculties in Rosenthal’s two
accounts of Moorean absurdity, in particular that both are
incomplete in not addressing Moorean belief. In §6, I examine
Rosenthal’s higher-order theory of conscious belief and show
that it fails to capture the nature of self-awareness. In §7, I
modify his account to avoid this snag and supplement it with
the principle that conscious belief both distributes and collects
over conjunction. This diagnoses the absurdity of conscious
Moorean belief as the awareness of self-contradictory belief.
In §8, I examine Brentano’s rival account of conscious belief
and in §9, show how it provides a diﬀerent diagnosis of the
absurdity of conscious Moorean belief. In §10, I show that the
Rosenthal-inspired account has the advantage of avoiding two
strong objections to Brentano’s. In §11, I show how the
awareness of Moorean beliefs provides an opportunity for one
to revise one’s beliefs for the better. Finally in §12, I explain
the absurdity of Moorean assertion, in compliance with Shoe-
maker’s strategy, in terms of conscious belief.
1. ABSURD ASSERTIONS AND BELIEFS: THE TRAPPIST MONK
Given that there is a relation between absurd beliefs and absurd
assertions, we could try explaining the absurdity of Moorean
belief in terms of Moorean assertion. But this strategy does not
seem promising. Most commentators on Moore’s paradox as-
sume that
If I assert that p then I believe that p.
But this assumption seems falsiﬁed by the possibility of insin-
cere assertions, notably lies. However, it is incontrovertible that
If I sincerely assert that p then I believe that p.
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But it does not follow from this that
If my sincere assertion that p is absurd in some way then my
belief that p is absurd in the same way.
For a counterexample to this claim is my assertion
I am asserting nothing now.
Such an assertion would be absurd. For although the content of
my assertion might be true, it cannot be true once I assert it. As
a reasonable speaker I would recognise that my assertion is self-
falsifying in this way and so would not believe my own words.
By contrast, it would not be absurd at all of me to believe that I
am asserting nothing now if I am a Trappist monk who rec-
ognises my continuing obedience to a vow of silence. What does
follow however is the reverse connection that
If my belief that p is absurd then my sincere assertion that p
is also absurd
One way of cashing out this connection is the claim that
If I assert that p then I ostensibly express my belief that p
in the sense that in making an assertion to you I deliberately
oﬀer you defeasible reason to think that I believe my own
words (see Williams 1996). Shoemaker endorses this direction
of the connection5 in his principle that
If I cannot non-absurdly believe that p then I cannot non-
absurdly assert that p, but not conversely.
In other words,
If my belief that p is necessarily absurd then my assertion
that p is necessarily absurd as well
where the failure of the converse is supported by the example of
the Trappist monk.
On this strategy we may explain the absurdity of Moorean
assertions by extrapolating to the absurd beliefs such assertions
ostensibly express.
This approach might be challenged by the claim that not even
the most irrational person could assert or believe such a thing as
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Moore’s examples. If this were true then no Moorean beliefs
could be available to explain absurd assertions. But then again,
there could be no Moorean assertions to be explained either.
Rather than denying that Moore’s paradox arises, it seems more
fruitful to accept that Imayutter thewords ‘‘Iwent to the pictures
last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did’’ as an assertion that is
defective in some way. Of course, if it is logically impossible even
for amaximally irrational speaker to believe these words then the
strategy I propose would not be viable. Instead we would have to
explain the absurdity of Moorean assertion in terms of the
putative fact that it is necessarily insincere.
However there seems to be no good reason to think that
Moorean belief, nor indeed any other kind of belief, is impos-
sible. Given that it is possible for someone like Hobbes to
believe a self-contradiction (that there is a method of con-
structing, with compass and straightedge, a square that is
guaranteed to have the same area as that of a given circle) there
seems little motivation for denying that someone might be
irrational enough to hold a Moorean belief, which by contrast
might be true. At this point it is useful to note some key fea-
tures of conscious belief.
2. FOUR FEATURES OF AWARENESS OF BELIEF
Suppose that I have been sitting next to the window for some
time. Although I may only be peripherally aware of the weather,
I may be aware of it enough to unconsciously register changes of
rainfall. I could probably recall the onset of rain, although I
have yet to be aware of any changes in my recent beliefs about
rain. Other unconscious beliefs include prejudices that I sin-
cerely but mistakenly deny holding. Since I don’t suddenly pass
into total ignorance by falling into a dreamless sleep, they also
include beliefs that I hold when dreamlessly asleep. By contrast,
suppose that I peer out of the window in search of ﬁne weather.
My disappointment at discovering rain might go hand in hand
with my awareness that I think it is raining.
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There are four features of the awareness of belief we should
note. First, I have used ‘‘aware’’ as a synonym of ‘‘conscious’’.
This seems unobjectionable. Where N is a noun, surely I’m
conscious of having an N just in case I’m aware of having an N.
To say that I am conscious of a belief, fear, suspicion or
toothache is just to say that I am aware of having it.
Second, I take ‘‘aware’’ as factive in the sense in which ‘‘I’m
aware of a toothache I don’t have’’ reports a self-contradiction.
Against this, it might be objected that if I am aware of a as being
F, a must exist but it need not be F. For example, I might be
aware of the cat as it moves around behind me but mistake it for
the dog. But this objection is harmless. In being aware of the cat
then there is a cat of which I am aware. There is no dog but then
it is not the dog I’m aware of. Surely I am not aware of the cat as
being the dog (for then surely it would be the dog). Rather I am
aware of the cat as seeming to be the dog. But then it is true that
the cat seems to be the dog. So instead of claiming that
I am aware of a seeming to be F only if a exists and a really is F
it is best to note that
I am aware of a seeming to be F only if a exists and a really
seems to be F.
So the facticity of awareness, at least for my purposes, remains
intact. It follows that I cannot be aware of holding a belief
unless I really do hold it. Just as I am aware of a toothache by
knowing or truly believing that I have it, so I am aware of my
belief that p only if I know or truly believe that I hold the belief
that p.
Third, we should distinguish the question of whether a
belief is conscious from the question of whether it is occur-
rent. My occurrent belief or awareness is one that I have just
formed. So to say that I am aware of a belief is neutral on
the question of whether I have just formed that belief or
whether I have just become aware of holding it. Finally, in
becoming aware of holding a belief surely I not only become
aware of that belief itself but also become aware of myself as
holding it.
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3. WHY AWARENESS OF BELIEF IS IMPORTANT TO MOOREAN
ABSURDITY
There are two connections between beliefs of which one is
aware and assertions. The ﬁrst is that in making an assertion, I
can only express a belief of which I am aware. For suppose that
I mutter, ‘‘Bush is a moron’’ in my sleep. This would not
express my belief that Bush is a moron but would rather
manifest it. The diﬀerence is that
I manifest my N just in case I behave in a way that aﬀords
you reason to think I have N.
By contrast, I express my N just in case I behave in a way that
oﬀers you reason to think that I have N, in other words,
intentionally aﬀords you that reason. Where N is a belief this
gives us a deﬁnition of expression of belief:
I express my belief that p to you just in case I believe that p
and I intentionally behave in a way that oﬀers you reason to
think that I believe that p
This ﬁts with a deﬁnition of assertion that nicely accommodates
lying:
I assert that p to you just in case I ostensibly express my
belief that p to you with the intention of changing your mind
in a relevant way.
This deﬁnition explains why I must be aware of the beliefs that
I express by my assertions. For I can hardly oﬀer you a reason
to think that I have what I am unaware of having.
The second connection is that the hearer of my assertion
cannot accept my words without acquiring beliefs of which he
is aware. Suppose that you ask me if you can still get a beer
in the Red Lion and I reply by saying ‘‘The pubs are still
open’’. If you believe me then you will come to believe my
words. But this belief you have just acquired can hardly be
one of which you are unaware. Rather it is a thought that
you have just formed, and have just become aware of, as I
make my assertion to you. Moreover, you would not nor-
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mally come to believe my words unless you also came to
believe that I was sincere in my assertion. So you will also
come to think that I believe that the pubs are still open.
Again, this belief you have just acquired can hardly be one of
which you are unaware.
Now consider Moorean belief. If you knew that I had a
Moorean belief but was unaware of having it then you should
be able to see that I was absurd. By contrast, if you knew that I
was aware of having such a belief then you should be able to see
that I this makes me more absurd unless such awareness leads
me to revise my beliefs for the better.
Most importantly, the awareness of belief is relevant to the
diagnosis of the absurdity of Moorean belief. Most explana-
tions of the absurdity of Moorean belief diagnose it in terms of
the irrationality of holding a pair of contradictory beliefs,6
namely those that contradict each other.
For example, in addressing only the commissive belief, Jane
Heal (1994, p. 21–22) plausibly assumes that belief distributes
over conjunction:
If I believe that (p & q) then I believe that p and I believe that q
So if I believe that (p & I believe that not-p) then I believe that p
and I believe that I believe that not-p. Heal also endorses the
more controversial principle of belief-elimination,
If I believe that I believe that p then I believe that p.
So I believe that p and I believe that not-p.
My previous account (Williams 1994, 1996 and 1998) like-
wise proceeds in terms of a pair of contradictory beliefs.
Assuming only that belief distributes over conjunction, my
forming the belief that (p & I don’t believe that p) falsiﬁes its
second conjunct. So although I may form that belief and
although what I believe might be true, it cannot be true if I
believe it. When my belief is commissive this result is avoided
only if I hold contradictory beliefs about whether p.7 Since this
is something I am in a position to work out (as we just did) on
minimal reﬂection,8 I am irrational in continuing to hold the
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Moorean belief. For a self-falsifying belief is as useless as a
guide to the truth as a pair of contradictory beliefs. Any
evidence that (absurdly) justiﬁes me in coming to believe the
omissive proposition would justify me in believing what is then
false. Likewise any evidence for my belief that p is ipso facto
evidence against my belief that not-p and conversely. None-
theless the two irrationalities are distinct, as we should expect
from the clear diﬀerence between a speciﬁc lack of true belief
and a speciﬁc mistake in belief.
But the irrationality of Moorean belief is surely severer
than that of holding a pair of contradictory beliefs (De Al-
meida, 2001, p. 43; Kriegel, 2004) for we may consistently
suppose that I have contradictory beliefs because I am una-
ware of one or both of them. For example, a visit to a psy-
chiatrist might unearth my long-repressed belief that my
mother was an adulterer that persists in the face of my sincere
adult assertion that she was not. Before the visit I held a pair
of contradictory beliefs about my mother. But since I was not
aware of both beliefs I was in no position to revise them. At
that stage it would be harsh to judge me ‘‘absurd’’. A better
account would diagnose the irrationality of Moorean belief as
a single belief in a self-contradiction, as when I believe that
both (p & not-p).
What underpins this distinction is the failure of belief to
collect over conjunction, in other words the failure of the
principle
If I believe that p and I believe that q then I believe that (p&q).
This failure likewise underpins the diﬀerence between believing
a self-contradiction and holding a set of inconsistent beliefs, as
when I believe that p and believe that q and believe that not-(p
& q). This tripartite distinction is the diﬀerence between
holding a belief that contradicts itself, holding beliefs that
contradict each other and holding a set of beliefs that cannot
all be true.9 I now turn to the crucial question of the distri-
bution and collection of belief over conjunction.
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4. DISTRIBUTION AND COLLECTION OF BELIEF OVER
CONJUNCTION
There are two reasons why belief per se fails to collect over
conjunction. First of all, surely I cannot think the fat thought
that conjoins the content of all the beliefs that I hold about the
world, at least not in a way that makes me aware of that
thought. What explains this inability is the conjecture that
Mybelief that p requiresmy ability to think the thought that p.
This required ability of thought explains why although we may
intuitively suppose that a dog has rudimentary beliefs about the
food in its bowl (which helps us explain its behaviour as it
strains at its leash), we hesitate to attribute to it the belief that it
will be beaten in Lent. Clearly it does not have the concept of
Lent and so lacks the ability to think thoughts of Lent. The
requirement also explains our diﬃculty in characterizing the
beliefs of other species in any ﬁne-grained way, since it is dif-
ﬁcult to specify, using the linguistic expressions of our thoughts,
exactly what concepts (or derivatively, thoughts) are available
to those with radically diﬀerent linguistic capacities and ways of
behaving.
Admittedly, the required ability of thought is challenged by
the fact that in one sense I can believe things on authority that I
do not understand. For example, I may believe an authority on
physics who assures me that entropy is increasing although I
have no idea what entropy is. But believing that she has said
something true is diﬀerent from believing what she says. Al-
though I don’t believe that entropy is increasing, I do believe
that she has said something true (although I don’t know what)
because although I cannot think thoughts of entropy, I can
think the thought that by using the word ‘‘entropy’’, she has
said something true.10
Granted this, I may be unable to think the thought of the
fat conjunction of all of my present beliefs although I have
the ability to think the thought of each of my present beliefs
separately. One reason for my inability is not that I lack the
relevant concepts needed to think the would-be thought, but
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rather because that thought is just too complex for me to
think. But in such a case I could not even hold an
unconscious belief of the conjunction of everything I now
believe.
A second reason why belief does not collect over conjunction
is given by the following possibility. Suppose that I know a
priori that it is false that both p and not-p yet continue to
separately believe that p and believe that not-p, because I am
unaware of one or both of these beliefs. Were belief to collect
over conjunction, I would know what I believe to be false. But
there is reason to rule this out. For it is now uncontroversial
that
If I know that p then I believe that p.
But having accepted this we should also accept
If I know that p then I don’t believe that not-p.
Otherwise we would have to accept the possibility that I know
what I hold contradictory beliefs about. But such ‘knowledge’
would hardly be conducive to ﬁnding the truth.
By contrast there is no reason to deny the plausible claim
that belief distributes over conjunction, whether it is occur-
rent, non-occurrent or conscious. If my stepping out of the
door into wet and cold weather leads me to acquire the belief
that it is wet and cold then surely it leads me to then acquire
the belief that it is wet and leads me to then acquire the belief
that it is cold. So the balance of evidence is in favour of the
principle
If I form the belief that (p & q) at t then I form the belief that
p at t and I form the belief that q at t.
Likewise, if I am disposed to behave as if it is wet and cold (for
example by putting on my raincoat and scarf) then surely I am
disposed to behave as if it is wet (for example by putting on my
raincoat) and am also disposed to behave as if it is cold (for
example by putting on my scarf). So again, in the absence of
any counterexample, it seems plausible that
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If I am disposed to believe that (p & q) then I am disposed to
believe that p and I am disposed to believe that q.
Now suppose that I become aware of my belief that it is wet
and cold. Surely I then become aware of my belief that it is wet
and become aware of my belief that it is cold. So again it seems
plausible that
If I am aware of my belief that (p & q) then I am aware of my
belief that p and I am aware of my belief that q.
Since belief distributes but does not collect over conjunction, if
I hold a self-contradictory belief then I hold contradictory be-
liefs but not conversely. And if I hold contradictory beliefs I
hold a set of inconsistent beliefs but not conversely.
It is more irrational to hold a self-contradictory belief than
to hold a pair of contradictory beliefs. For self-contradictory
beliefs are less conducive to truth than pairs of contradictory
beliefs. When I hold contradictory beliefs half of my beliefs are
bound to be true. But when I hold a self-contradictory belief
then all my beliefs are bound to be false.
However it is much more plausible to claim that conscious
belief collects over conjunction:
If I consciously believe that p at t and consciously believe
that q at t then I consciously believe that (p & q) at t.
Suppose that as I step out into inclement weather, I become
aware of my belief that it is cold at the same moment that I
become aware of my belief that it is wet. Surely I am then
aware of a single belief that it is both cold and wet. In the
absence of counterexample we should accept this principle.
Having done so, we may now say that conscious belief both
collects and distributes over conjunction. So an interesting
feature of consciousness is that in becoming aware of each of
a pair of contradictory belief I become aware of a single
belief in a self-contradiction.
We noted that any satisfactory account of Moorean
absurdity should explain the absurdity of both Moorean
assertion and Moorean belief. I have defended the strategy of
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ﬁrst explaining the absurdity of Moorean belief and then
explaining the absurdity of Moorean assertion in terms of
Moorean belief. I have argued that such an explanation
should diagnose the irrationality in terms of a self-contra-
dictory belief, rather than merely in terms of a pair of con-
tradictory beliefs. As we shall see, the supposition that one
holds a conscious Moorean belief promises to deliver just
such a satisfactory explanation. I will argue that Rosenthal’s
higher order thought theory may be developed to fulﬁl this
promise. But Rosenthal himself thinks that all that needs
explaining is the absurdity of Moorean assertion and that
doing so need not appeal to Moorean belief.
5. ROSENTHAL’S TWO ACCOUNTS OF MOOREAN ASSERTION
Rosenthal has two diﬀerent accounts of why such an assertion
cannot be ‘‘genuine’’ (2002) or ‘‘coherent’’ (1995b). In his later
account (2002, p. 170) he holds that the omissive sentence
. . . is not assertible because one conjunct denies the occurrence at that time
of the occurrent intentional state required for the other conjunct to perform
a genuine illocutionary act.
In other words, in asserting that (p & I don’t believe that p), I
deny that I have the occurrent belief that p, one that I must have
if my assertion that p is to be ‘‘genuine’’. Rosenthal further
holds that the commissive assertion is not assertible because one
conjunct asserts the occurrence at that time of an intentional
state ‘‘manifestly incompatible’’ (2002, p. 170) with that re-
quired for the other conjunct to perform a genuine illocutionary
act. In other words, in asserting that (p & I believe that not-p), I
assert that I have the occurrent belief that not-p, one that I
cannot have if my assertion that p is to be ‘‘genuine’’, unless I
hold contradictory occurrent beliefs about whether p. But there
are two problems with this account. Firstly, it assumes that
If I make a genuine assertion that p then I believe that p.
There are two senses in which an assertion can be said to be
genuine. But Rosenthal’s assumption is not true in either sense.
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These two senses correspond to the distinction between success-
fullymaking an assertion andmaking a successful assertion. I fail
to make an assertion if I utter, ‘‘The pubs are still open’’ but am
too drunk to articulate these words intelligibly. Nor do I succeed
in making an assertion if I utter these words as an actor in a play,
since all I attempt is to depict the assertion of a ﬁctional guise.
Having successfully made an assertion, that assertion may suc-
ceed or fail depending upon its point, in other words what change
ofmind I intend tobringabout inyou.For example, in attempting
to inform or let you know that p, I intend to get you to know that
p.WhenI lie toyou thatp, I intend togetyou tomistakenlybelieve
that p. So insincere assertions, notably lies, may be genuine
assertions in both senses. This falsiﬁes the crucial assumption
Rosenthal needs.Moreover, as Baldwin points out (1990, p. 228)
if you learn that I’m lying to you when I make omissive or
commissiveMoorean assertions, this knowledge does nothing to
expunge the absurdity.
In his earlier account (1995b, fn 15, p. 208) Rosenthal
anticipates this objection with the heroic claim that lies are not
genuine assertions but are rather bits of play-acting. But then it
would follow that I could refute the accusation that I have told
you a lie by merely admitting that I was lying, for then I could
not have told you anything. Austin (1970, p. 69–71) is similarly
heroic in holding that if I insincerely say ‘‘I promise,’’ I don’t
strictly speaking promise but only say I do. But if this were true
then it would make a mockery of justice. For then I could
conveniently escape from a contractual promise by just
admitting my insincerity. A seminar that succeeds in teaching
people to be more assertive need not make them more sincere.
Nor need it make them tell the truth more often. So although
liars only pretend to believe what they assert, they really do
make assertions. In other words, although liars are not genuine
(in the sense that they are not sincere) their lies are genuine
assertions.
Nonetheless Rosenthal does approach the insight that when
I make the omissive assertion to you, I in eﬀect tell you that I
am insincere and in the commissive assertion, tell you that I am
guilty of a stronger form of insincerity, namely lying. This
JOHN NICHOLAS WILLIAMS396
defeats the point of the assertion, whether it is my attempt to
inform or deceive you, for then you will not believe that my
words are true.
The second problem with the account is that Rosenthal has
to claim that my commissive assertion cannot be genuine unless
I hold contradictory belief about whether p. So the only way
that he can show that my commissive assertion could not be
genuine is by showing that I could not hold contradictory
beliefs. But there seems no reason why it is impossible for
someone to hold a pair of contradictory beliefs.
In (1995b, p. 200), Rosenthal oﬀers a diﬀerent explanation of
the absurdity:
Moore’s paradox is absurd because the speech acts of asserting that p and
asserting that I think that p, though they diﬀer in respect of their truth-
conditions, have roughly the same conditions of [coherent] assertability.
Any circumstances in which I could [coherently] say that p are circumstances
in which I could [coherently] say I think that p. And with one qualiﬁcation
that won’t aﬀect the argument here, the converse holds as well.
Since Rosenthal’s conclusion is that there are no circum-
stances in one can use Moorean sentences to perform
‘‘coherent’’ assertions (1995b, p. 195) my parenthetical inser-
tions into his passage are in order. In other words, the con-
ditions in which I could coherently assert that p are identical
to those in which I could coherently assert that I think that p,
with equal appropriateness. Thus in response to the question
whether it is raining, one could just as appropriately reply,
‘‘Yes’’ as say, ‘‘I think so’’. Assume that the conditions under
which I may coherently assert ‘‘p’’ and those under which I
may coherently assert ‘‘not p’’ are mutually exclusive. Assume
also that the conditions in which I may coherently assert a
conjunction include those in which I may coherently assert its
conjuncts. Then the conditions under which I may coherently
assert that (p & I don’t believe that p) include those in which I
may coherently assert that p. These are identical to those in
which I may coherent assert that I believe that p. So they
exclude conditions under which I may coherently assert that I
don’t believe that p. But since the conditions under which
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I may coherently assert a conjunction include those in which I
may coherently assert its conjuncts, these include conditions in
which I may coherently assert that I don’t believe that p.
Since this is a contradiction, there cannot be any conditions in
which I may coherently make the omissive assertion that (p &
I don’t believe that p).
Rosenthal would have to explain the commissive assertion as
follows: since the conditions in which I may coherently assert a
conjunction include those in which I may coherently assert its
conjuncts, the conditions in which I may coherently assert that
(p & I believe that not-p) include those in which I may coherently
assert that I believe that not-p. But conditions in which I may
coherently assert that I believe that not-p are identical to those in
which I may coherently assert that not-p, with equal appropri-
ateness. These exclude conditions in which I may coherently
assert that p. But since the conditions in which I may coher-
ently assert a conjunction include those inwhich Imay coherently
assert its conjuncts, the conditions in which I may coherently
assert that (p & I believe that not-p) include those in which I may
coherently assert that p. Since this is a contradiction, there cannot
be any conditions in which I may coherently make the commis-
sive assertion that (p & I believe that not-p).
But we may challenge Rosenthal’s claim that the conditions
in which I could coherently assert that p are identical to those in
which I could coherently assert that I believe that p, with equal
appropriateness. Suppose that you ask me whether the pubs are
still open and I honestly reply, ‘‘I wouldn’t like to say, but I
think so’’ then the conditions under which I’ve asserted that I
believe that the pubs are still open don’t seem to include those
in which it is appropriate to assert that they are. If this chal-
lenge succeeds then Rosenthal is left only with the claim that
the conditions in which I may coherently assert that p include
those in which I may, with equal appropriateness, coherently
assert that I believe that p. This leaves Rosenthal’s account of
the omissive case untouched but damages the parallel account
of the commissive case, because that account requires the claim
that conditions in which I may coherently assert that I believe
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that not-p include those in which I may, with equal appropri-
ateness, coherently assert that not-p.
A second objection to the account is that we have no reason
to think that the conditions under which I may coherently as-
sert ‘‘p’’ and those under which I may coherently assert ‘‘not p’’
are mutually exclusive, without a fuller account of ‘‘asserta-
bility conditions’’. Of course there are no conditions in which I
may coherently assert ‘‘p & not-p’’. But if you ask me whether
the pubs are open and I really have no idea whether they are,
then although I may be blamed for giving any deﬁnite answer,
it may nonetheless be as coherent to answer ‘‘Yes’’ as to an-
swer, ‘‘No’’.
But the main problem with either account is that I seem no
less absurd if I silently believe Moore’s examples without
asserting them. In that case an explanation of the absurdity
that, like Rosenthal’s, is restricted to assertion, will be incom-
plete. Perhaps Rosenthal thinks that it is impossible for even
the most irrational of speakers to hold a Moorean belief. In
that case, the reason why this is so should demonstrate to any
hearer of my assertion that I cannot believe my own words. In
other words, the hearer would be in a position to see that my
assertion is necessarily insincere and so would not accept my
words either. The alternative can only be that there is a reason
why it would be severely irrational of me to hold a Moorean
belief. In the absence of any argument that Moorean belief is
impossible, this alternative is preferable. Ironically, this alter-
native is already available to Rosenthal in his account of con-
scious belief. For that account may be developed in a way that
provides a satisfactory explanation of the severe irrationality of
holding a conscious Moorean belief, namely that such a thinker
is aware of believing a self-contradiction.
6. ROSENTHAL’S ACCOUNT OF CONSCIOUS BELIEF
We have noted that in becoming aware of holding a belief I also
become aware of myself as holding it. Rosenthal’s analysis of
conscious belief attempts to capture this feature. According to
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Rosenthal (1997) I am conscious of my belief that p just in case
I have a ‘‘suitable’’ thought about that belief. Since my mere
supposition that I hold a belief would not make me aware of a
belief that I really do hold, the suitable higher-order thought in
question had best be a belief. Rosenthal observes (1997, p. 471)
that this second-order occurrent belief is suitable only if it
represents not only the occurrence of the ﬁrst-order belief, but
also represents myself as myself in that state of belief. Consis-
tently with this, Rosenthal holds a higher order principle of
conscious belief:
If I consciously believe that p then I believe that p and I
believe that I myself believe that p.
This de se element is needed. For even if I am Williams, my
belief that Williams now believes that that p would not capture
my awareness of my own belief. For I might not realise that I
am Williams but have in mind someone else. Rosenthal adds
that the second-order belief must be formed at roughly the
same time as the ﬁrst. This also seems plausible. For if I acquire
the conscious belief that it is raining as I peer out of the window
in search of dry weather, then I acquire the belief that I believe
that it is raining more or less as I come to believe that it is
raining. Rosenthal further adds that the second-order belief
must be formed non-observationally and non-inferentially. This
seems correct as well. Although my observation of rain plays a
part in the causal history of my belief that it is raining, it is not
what licenses my belief that I hold this belief. Nor is that second
order belief a result of ghostly observation of, or inference
from, the ﬁrst. As Evans points out (1982, p. 225–6) to decide
whether I believe that it is raining all I normally have to do is to
look to the outside world and decide whether it is raining.
But Rosenthal’s higher order principle of conscious belief fails
to capture the fact of my self-awareness. Admittedly, my second-
order belief that I believe that it is raining representsmyself. But I
may be unaware of holding this second-order belief. In that case
my second-orderbelief is not a conscious representationofmyself.
So holding it does not guarantee that I amaware ofmyself. But as
we will now see, this snag may be avoided.
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7. MODIFYING ROSENTHAL’S ACCOUNT OF CONSCIOUS
BELIEF
I have argued that Rosenthal is wrong in thinking that the
absurdity of Moorean belief need not be explained. So it is
worth deciding whether Rosenthal’s principle will help us to
explain the absurdity of conscious Moorean belief. It turns out
that it does, but to see this we must ﬁrst consider another snag.
This is that the principle needs supplement. This need is shown
by Baldwin’s (1990, p. 230) account of the absurdity, one that
implicitly anticipates Rosenthal’s principle. Baldwin argues that
. . . a rational thinker will not consciously hold a Moorean belief. For to
hold a belief consciously is both to hold the belief and be aware, and thus
believe, that one holds it; and no rational thinker will believe either that he
both believes and fails to believe the same thing (which is required by a
conscious belief that p and that one does not believe that p) or that he both
believes and disbelieves the same thing (which is required by conscious belief
that p and that one believes that not-p).
So if I consciously believe that (p & I don’t believe that p) then
Rosenthal’s principle means that I believe that (p & I don’t be-
lieve that p) and also hold the belief that I believe that (p& I don’t
believe that p). But clearly some other principle is needed as well
in order to derivemy single belief that I both do and don’t believe
that p. One such plausible principle that comes to mind is that
conscious belief distributes over conjunction, one I defended
above. So if I consciously believe that (p & I don’t believe that p)
then I consciously believe that I don’t believe that p. But by the
same principle I consciously believe that p, so by Rosenthal’s
principle, I believe that I do believe that p.11 So I hold a pair of
contradictory beliefs. But this result does not ﬁt Baldwin’s
description of my omissive belief as my single belief that I both
do and don’t believe that p. For the commissive belief, parallel
reasoning delivers the result that I believe that I believe that p
and I believe that I believe that not-p.12 This hardly counts as my
single belief that I both believe and disbelieve that p.
As we noted above, Rosenthal’s principle predicts a higher-
order belief that need not be conscious. Indeed Rosenthal
cannot modify his principle as
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If I consciously believe that p then I believe that p and I
consciously believe that I believe that p
without some restriction. For on Rosenthal’s account my sec-
ond-order belief is a thought that occurs to me just after I have
formed the thought that constitutes my ﬁrst-order belief. So
unless restricted, the modiﬁcation would saddle us with an
inﬁnite succession of discrete mental performances that not
even the most rational thinker could complete.
But there is no reason why we should not qualify the mod-
iﬁed principle with the restriction that it may only be applied a
ﬁnite number of times. This restriction is dictated by the
conjecture that to believe that p, such a human being must
possess the ability to think the thought that p. Moreover it
seems reasonable to expect that a fairly reﬂective thinker would
be aware of her second-order beliefs. Thus the vicious regress
may be blocked in a principled way. To overcome the second
snag in deriving a single self-contradictory belief, we may
appeal to the principle that conscious belief both collects and
distributes over conjunction, as defended above.
Then we may argue as follows. Suppose that I consciously
believe that (p & I don’t believe that p). Since conscious belief
distributes over conjunction, I consciously believe that p (as
well as consciously believing that I don’t believe that p). So by
the modiﬁed and now restricted Rosenthal principle, I con-
sciously believe that I believe that p. So I consciously believe
that I do believe that p and I consciously believe that I don’t
believe that p. So since conscious belief collects over conjunc-
tion, I consciously believe that I both do and don’t believe that
p.13 In other words, I am aware of my self-contradictory belief.
Surely this awareness of such irrationality should lead me to
revise my beliefs for the better.
Parallel reasoning delivers the result that if I consciously
hold the commissive belief, then I consciously believe that I
hold a pair of contradictory beliefs.14 Again, such awareness
signals my need to revise my beliefs in some way.
Finally, the objection we considered in the last section is now
neutralised. For as a reasonably reﬂective thinker, I will be
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aware of my second-order belief that I believe that it is raining
and so will be aware of myself.
8. BRENTANO’S RIVAL ACCOUNT OF CONSCIOUS BELIEF
Brentano (1874, chapters 1–2) provides a rival account.
Brentano holds that it is a distinctive property of all conscious
mental states, including beliefs, that they ‘‘include within them
an implicit awareness of themselves’’ (1874, pp. 127–8). In other
words, in being aware of my beliefs I am aware, among other
things, of myself. More speciﬁcally, Brentano’s principle of
conscious belief is that
I consciously believe that p just in case I believe that (p & I
myself believe that p).
This diﬀers from Rosenthal’s principle, according to which
every conscious belief is accompanied by a separate belief about
it. Moreover, Brentano’s analysis is a deﬁnition of conscious
belief, unlike Rosenthal’s principle. On that deﬁnition, the be-
lief that represents myself is a belief of which I am aware. This
avoids the objection against Rosenthal’s unmodiﬁed principle.
An equivalent formulation of Brentano’s deﬁnition is that I
consciously believe that p just in case I believe that I myself truly
believe that p. This is consistent with Wittgenstein’s observation
(1980, § 490) that in considering what I believe about the world,
I cannot hold apart my conception of the world from how I
take the world to be. By contrast, Rosenthal holds that I
consciously believe that p only if I truly believe that I myself
believe that p. Since belief distributes but does not collect over
conjunction, Brentano’s deﬁnition entails Rosenthal’s principle
but is not entailed by it.
Both accounts may explain our intuition that animals are
incapable of holding conscious beliefs. On both accounts, such
beliefs require a belief about the self as well as a belief about
belief. Given that most animals do not possess such sophisti-
cated concepts, then the conjecture that a subject’s belief that p
requires the subject’s ability to think the thought that p, pro-
hibits most animals from forming conscious beliefs.
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9. APPLYING BRENTANO’S ACCOUNT TO MOOREAN BELIEF
Brentano’s principle provides a simple explanation of the
absurdity of conscious Moorean belief. Suppose that I con-
sciously hold the omissive belief that (p & I don’t believe that
p). Then by Brentano’s principle
I believe that [(p & I don’t believe that p) and I believe that
(p & I don’t believe that p)].
The ﬁrst conjunct of what I believe is true only if I don’t believe
that p. But since belief distributes over conjunction, the second
conjunct of what I believe is true only if I do believe that p. So I
hold a self-contradictory or necessarily false belief. It follows
that when I hold an omissive Moorean belief, what I believe
might be true unless I believe it. But when I hold that belief
consciously, what I believe cannot be true.
Now suppose that I consciously hold the commissive belief
that (p & I believe that not-p). Then by Brentano’s principle
I believe that [(p & I believe that not-p) and I believe that
(p & I believe that not-p)].
The ﬁrst conjunct of what I believe is true only if I believe that
not-p. But since belief distributes over conjunction, the second
conjunct of what I believe is true only if I believe that p. So what
I believe is true only if I hold contradictory beliefs about
whether p.
This last result is stronger than that provided by my original
account. On the original account, when I come to believe that
(p & I believe that not-p) this act of belief falsiﬁes the content of
that belief unless I hold contradictory beliefs about whether
p. Nonetheless that content, in other words that I mistakenly
believe that p, might be true whether or not I hold contradictory
beliefs about whether p. But on Brentano’s account, if I con-
sciously believe that (p & I believe that not-p) then the full
content of that belief cannot be true unless I hold contradictory
beliefs about whether p.
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10. COMPARING THESE TWO ACCOUNTS
My modiﬁcation of Rosenthal’s account predicts that when I
hold the omissive belief that (it is raining but I don’t believe
that it is raining) but am unaware of doing so, then my belief is
self-falsifying. But when I become aware of it, then I con-
sciously believe a self-contradiction. When I hold the commis-
sive belief that (it is raining but I believe that it is not raining)
but am unaware of doing so, then my belief is self-falsifying
unless I hold a pair of contradictory beliefs. But when I become
aware of my belief, then I consciously believe that I hold a pair
of contradictory beliefs.
By contrast, the result Brentano predicts is that when I
become aware of the omissive belief then what I believe is a
self-contradiction. And when become aware of the commis-
sive belief then what I believe is necessarily false unless I
hold a pair of contradictory beliefs.
Both theories are economical. The ﬁrst appeals to my
modiﬁcation of Rosenthal’s principle plus the fact that con-
scious belief both collects and distributes over conjunction. The
Brentano-inspired alternative appeals to Brentano’s deﬁnition
of conscious belief plus the fact that belief of any kind dis-
tributes over conjunction.
But the ﬁrst theory seems to have the edge. For there are two
strong objections to the second to which the ﬁrst is not vul-
nerable. The ﬁrst objection is that the Brentano-inspired theory
must say that once I become aware of my Moorean belief then
what I believe is a self-contradiction. But the very paradox is set
up in acknowledgement that the content of that belief might be
true. However a follower of Brentano could reply that given a
theory of appropriate belief-revision, one’s awareness of certain
types of irrational belief can only result in beliefs that are al-
ready changed. Or he could try weakening Brentano’s deﬁni-
tion of a conscious belief to a mere conditional. But Rosenthal
may avoid all of this even if he concedes, as I think he should,
that Moorean assertion prompts the need for an explanation of
Moorean belief.
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The second objection is that Brentano’s deﬁnition of con-
scious belief is not generalisable to other conscious inten-
tional states. For surely my consciously wondering whether p
cannot be my wondering whether (p & I myself wonder
whether p).
But it might be replied that the example of wondering is
unfair in virtue of its peculiar oddness. For wondering seems
to be necessarily a state one is aware of. I may unconsciously
desire to sleep with my wife’s sister but can I unconsciously
wonder if she would be willing? Nonetheless we should admit
that my conscious desire to make it the case that I am
drinking beer does not seem to be my desire to make it the
case that (I am drinking beer and I desire to make it the case
that I am drinking beer). After all, I might be uncomfortably
aware of the desire for beer in the knowledge that this desire
is unwelcome. Likewise, my conscious fear that the police will
raid me, doesn’t seem to be my fear that it will be the case
that (the police raid me but I myself fear that the police raid
me). For a deeper fear is that the raid will take me by sur-
prise. So it seems correct to say that my self-aware desire that
p is my true belief that I myself desire that p and that my
self-aware fear that p is my true belief that I myself fear that
p. In the absence of relevant diﬀerences between desire and
fear on the one hand and belief on the other, my self-aware
belief that p would be nothing more than my true belief that I
myself believe that p, as predicted by Rosenthal’s original
account.
But are there no relevant diﬀerences? After all, beliefs, unlike
desires or fears, are truth seeking in the sense that a good belief
is true. A further diﬀerence is that neither fear nor desire dis-
tribute over conjunction. I may sensibly fear that my wife and
girlfriend are both in the pub without fearing that my wife is in
the pub or fearing that my girlfriend is there. Likewise, I may
sensibly desire to drink beer with lemonade without desiring to
drink beer and without desiring to drink lemonade. So a fol-
lower of Brentano might still insist that my self-aware belief
that p is unique in being my belief that I myself truly believe
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that p. Since belief distributes over conjunction, this means that
it is also my true belief that I myself believe that p.
Once again however, the Rosenthal-inspired strategy avoids
such complications. Moreover, it provides a clearer explanation
of the increase in irrationality once one becomes aware of the
commissive belief.
11. CHANGING MY MIND
Given that I am irrational in my beliefs, becoming aware of
them provides me with an opportunity to revise them for the
better. This is one important way in which a higher-order belief
may cause diﬀerent behaviour from the belief it is about. So in
what way should I change my mind?
Suppose that it is a fact that (p & I don’t believe that p).
This fact impugns my knowledge but not my rationality. I am
merely ignorant of the truth that p. Now suppose that I come
to believe that (p & I don’t believe that p). Since belief dis-
tributes over conjunction, the second conjunct of what I be-
lieve becomes false. If I am aware of what I believe and am
at all rational I will realize this change of fact and will
accordingly give up my false belief that I don’t believe that p.
So if my omissive belief is conscious then it is part of a useful
recognition of my own speciﬁc ignorance, one that is ratio-
nally remedied by true belief. On the other hand if that
recognition leads me to no epistemic revision, then I am in-
deed irrational. For then I believe in eﬀect that I am ignorant
of the truth that p, yet mistakenly think that I don’t accept
that truth.
A similar revision of belief will be triggered by my awareness
of the commissive belief. Suppose that it is a fact that (p & I
believe that not-p). This fact impugns my infallibility but not
my rationality. Now suppose that I come to believe that (p &
I believe that not-p). Since belief distributes over conjunction, I
now hold contradictory beliefs. If I am aware of what I believe
and am at all rational I will realize this and will accordingly give
up one or both of these beliefs. So if my commissive belief is
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conscious, then it is part of a useful recognition of my own
speciﬁc mistake, one that is rationally corrected. On the other
hand if that recognition leads me to no epistemic revision, then
again I am irrational. For then I realise that I hold contradic-
tory beliefs yet continue to hold them. Such a case might occur
when exasperated by a particularly obtuse psychiatrist who
keeps reassuring me that my belief that I am being persecuted is
just a delusion, I remark, ‘‘Look, I bloody well know that
people aren’t persecuting me, but I just can’t help believing that
they are!’’
12. MOOREAN ASSERTION
With a few harmless exceptions,15 when I make an assertion to
you I intend to make you believe me, in other words, to believe
that I am sincerely telling the truth. We may take my apparent
attempt to make you think me sincere as my ostensible
expression of belief.
When I let you know that p, I fulﬁl my main intention of
imparting my knowledge to you. But when I tell you the lie
that p I attempt to make you mistakenly believe that p. In
either case I intend to get you to believe my words. But I
cannot succeed in this attempt unless I also get you to think
that I am sincere in making the assertion. For if you think
that I’m play-acting or recognise that I’m lying then you
have no reason to accept my words, so my attempt to impart
knowledge or lie to you will fail. Since I should see with
minimal reﬂection that this is so, my full intention must be
to get you to believe my words by getting you to think me
sincere in uttering them. In other words, I aim to make you
believe me in the sense of making you think I’m sincerely
telling the truth.16
Suppose that you now believe me when I assert to you
that (p & I don’t believe that p). This means that you now
believe me to be sincerely telling the truth. So you must now
think that I believe that p (in virtue of now thinking me
sincere) and you must now, in the same instant, believe that I
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don’t believe that p (in virtue of now thinking me to be
telling the truth). Moreover, these two beliefs you have just
acquired can hardly be beliefs of which you are unaware.
Rather they are conscious thoughts that you form as I make
my assertion to you.
Since your conscious beliefs collect over conjunction, it
follows that you now consciously believe that I both do and
don’t believe that p. Since you would be deeply irrational to
consciously believe a self-contradiction, I am in a position to
see, when I make the assertion to you, that you won’t believe
me unless you are deeply irrational. Since I should be chari-
table enough to try to avoid judging you irrational when I
attempt to communicate with you, I should see that you
couldn’t believe me.
A parallel line of reasoning applies to the commissive
assertion. Suppose that you come to believe me when I assert
to you that (p & I believe that not-p). You must now think
that I believe that p (in virtue of now thinking me to be
sincere) and you must now, in the same instant, believe that I
believe that not-p (in virtue of now thinking me to tell the
truth). Since these two beliefs you have just acquired are
conscious thoughts, you now consciously believe that I hold
contradictory beliefs about whether p.
Since this is in eﬀect a judgment that I am irrational, I am
in position to see, when I make the assertion to you, that you
won’t believe me unless you judge me irrational. And since I
should see that you would be charitable enough to try to
avoid judging me irrational when I attempt to communicate
with you, I should again see that you couldn’t believe me. So
in either case I should recognise that that you cannot believe
me unless you are theoretically irrational or judge me to be so.
Accordingly I should revise my plans. If I don’t then I’m
practically irrational.
This account complies with Shoemaker’s principle. For what
you must consciously believe if you believe me when I make a
Moorean assertion to you is identical to what I must con-
sciously believe if I am sincere in making it.
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NOTES
1 In parsing your ‘‘Either it is not raining or he believes that it is raining’’
as ‘‘If it is raining then he believes that it is raining’’ I take ‘if ’ as implica-
tion. Although such an inference is generally invalid, most would allow it
here. For example, Stalnaker 1975 and 1984 would allow it on pragmatic
grounds because you don’t know which disjunct is true. If we symbolise ‘‘I
believe that p’’ as ‘‘Bp’’ we have the following proof:
2 Sorensen (1988, chapter 3, pp. 16–56) is probably the ﬁrst commentator
to consider the nature of Moorean belief. Since then Williams 1994, 1996,
1998, Baldwin 1990, Heal 1994, Rosenthal 1995a, 1995b and Shoemaker
1995, 1988 have discussed it.
3 Sorensen coins these useful terms in (1988, p. 16).
4 This diﬀerence in formalism is disguised by Moore’s examples. This is
one reason to think that Moore himself did not see the diﬀerence. If we
formalise ‘‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did’’
as ‘‘p & Bp’’ then ‘‘I believe that he has gone out, but he has not’’ becomes
‘‘Bp & p’’. This commutes to ‘‘p & Bp’’. To achieve canonical reference
to belief this may be represented as ‘‘p & Bp’’.
5 Shoemaker (1995, fn. 1, p. 227) puts it this way: ‘‘What can be coher-
ently believed constrains what can be coherently asserted but not con-
versely’’. But since ‘‘coherently’’ is ambiguous between ‘‘consistently’’,
‘‘appropriately’’ and ‘‘rationally’’ then the principle best stick with Moore’s
own term ‘‘absurdly’’, by which he means ‘‘irrationally, either in theory or
practice’’.
6 Including Hintikka (1962, p. 67), Williams (1994, pp. 164-5, 1996, pp.
136-7, 1998, p. 296), Heal (1994, pp. 21–22) and Sorensen (1988, pp. 40–42
and 2000, p. 42).
7 Given
B-&Þ B(p & q)! (Bp & Bq) Belief distributes over conjunction
1. (p & Bp) Suppose the falsehood of Moorean assertion
2. p v Bp De Morgan’s Law
3. p v Bp  elim
4. p ﬁ Bp ﬁ equivalence
1. (p & Bp) & B(p & Bp) Suppose true commissive belief
2. p & Bp 1, &-elim
3. Bp 2, &-elim
4. B(p & Bp) 1, &-elim
5. Bp & BBp 4, B-&
6. Bp 5, &-elim
7. Bp & Bp 3, 5, &-intro.
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8 As De Almeida (2001, p. 42) notes, I need the minimal intelligence to
present myself with such an argument for the absurdity. But this hardly
constitutes an objection.
9 Against De Almeida (2001, pp. 42–43), my original diagnosis does not
predict that my belief that
I have at least one false belief
is Moorean, despite the fact that such a belief means that I have inconsistent
beliefs (in the sense that they cannot all be true). For since belief fails to collect
over conjunction, I may hold inconsistent beliefs, as when I believe that p and
believe that q and believe that not-(p & q), without holding contradictory
beliefs. Evidence for my belief in my occasional mistakenness need not count
against any of my other beliefs, nor visa versa. My correct belief in my
occasional mistakenness does not entail beliefs that contradict each other,
since wemay consistently suppose that I don’t believe that all of my beliefs are
true. See Williams (1996, p. 145) for further discussion of this point.
10 Similarly, when presented with the inscription, ‘‘1 + 1+ 1+1+ 1+ 1
+ 1 + 1+ 1 + 1 is greater than 1 + 1 +1 + 1 + 1 + 1’’, I may sincerely
assert, ‘‘That’s true’’ without having the thought that 10 is greater than 6.
What I believe is that the inscription says something true, in virtue of
believing that the number denoted by the left-hand side is greater than that
denoted by the right-hand side.
11 Using ‘Bcp’ to denote ‘I consciously believe that p’, given
RPÞ Bcp! ðBp & BBpÞ Rosenthal’s Principle
Bc-&Þ Bcðp & qÞ ! ðBcp & BcqÞ Conscious belief distributes
over conjunction
12 Given
RPÞ Bcp! ðBp & BBpÞ Rosenthal’s Principle
Bc-&Þ Bcðp & qÞ ! ðBcp & BcqÞ Conscious belief distributes
over conjunction
1. Bc(p&Bp) Suppose conscious omissive belief
2. Bcp & BcBp 1, Bc-&
3. Bcp 2, &-elim
4. Bp & BBp 3, RP
5. BBp 4, &-elim
6. BcBp 2, &-elim
7. BBp & BcBp 5, 6, &-intro
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13 Given
AÞ Bcðp & qÞ $ ðBcp & BcpÞ Conscious belief distributes and
collects over conjunction
RP’) Bcp! ðBp & BcBpÞ A modification of RP
restricted to finite recursions
14 Given
AÞ Bcðp& qÞ $ ðBcp & BcpÞ Conscious belief distributes and
collects over conjunction
RP’) Bcp! ðBp & BcBpÞ A modification of RP
restricted to finite recursions
1. Bc(p & Bp) Suppose conscious commissive belief
2. Bcp & BcBp 1, Bc-&
3. Bcp 2, &-elim
4. Bp & BBp 3, RP
5. BBp 4, &-elim
6. BcBp 2, &-elim
7. BBp & BcBp 5, 6, &-intro
1. Bc(p & Bp) Suppose conscious omissive belief
2. Bcp & BcBp 1, A
3. Bcp 2, &-elim
4. BcBp 2, &-elim
5. Bp & BcBp 3, RP’
6. BcBp 5, &-elim
7. BcBp & BcBp 4, 6 &-intro
8. Bc(Bp & Bp) 7, A. I consciously believe a
self-contradiction
1. Bc(p & Bp) Suppose conscious commissive belief
2. Bcp & BcBp 1, A
3. Bcp 2, &-elim
4. BcBp 2, &-elim
5. Bp & BcBp 3, RP’
6. BcBp 5, &-elim
7. BcBp & BcBp 4, 6 &-intro
8. Bc(Bp & Bp) 7, A. I consciously believe that I
hold a pair of contradictory beliefs
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15 One exception to this is when I say something to you merely in order
to ‘wind you up’. For example, suppose that I know that you think
highly of Bush’s intelligence, an opinion I in fact share. Nonetheless I
insincerely state that Bush is a moron in order to ‘rattle your cage’. Here
my intention is not to get you to believe my words by accepting my
sincerity but rather to ensure you remain verbally opposed to my words
by accepting my sincerity. Another exception occurs when I make a ‘Tom
Sawyer’ assertion to you. For example, on learning that you have just
discovered that I am a habitual liar, I decide to tell you the truth for
once. So when you ask me if the pubs are still open, I tell you the truth
that they are still open in order to deceive you into mistakenly thinking
that they are not. In both cases I aim to make you think that my words
are false. When my assertion is Moorean, the ﬁrst case is harmless be-
cause I can hardly hope to prolong verbal disagreement with you unless
you think (mistakenly) that I’m sincere. But I am in position to see that
you couldn’t take me to hold a Moorean belief unless you thought I was
irrational. The Tom Sawyer example is likewise harmless because my
intention to get you to mistakenly believe that my words are false means
that I believe that my own words are true. But when my assertion is
Moorean I cannot rationally believe my own words.
16 If I were a parrot who uttered, ‘‘I can ﬂy’’ you might believe my words
but could hardly believe me.
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